Statement made by Sweden in the First Committee of UNGA 75, on Disarmament and International Security, delivered by Ambassador Anna Karin Eneström.
Chair,
Sweden associates itself with the general statement by the European Union, as well as the one delivered on behalf of the Nordic countries. The following remarks are made in a national capacity.
We are meeting under extraordinary circumstances. The pressure put on our societies and lives by the global pandemic has been, and continues to be, immense.
In the shadow of the pandemic, the global security environment has continued to deteriorate, with increasing polarization and a severe lack of trust between countries. While imperiled, we have been strengthened in our conviction that multilateralism remains our only chance to address our many common challenges and to ensure international peace and security. On the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, this message rings truer than ever.
Chair,
We are witnessing the development of new nuclear capabilities, in parallel with the abandonment, or endangering, of landmark treaties that have regulated weapons of mass destruction for decades. Our collective goal of a world free from nuclear weapons seems further away than in a long time. The risk of another nuclear arms race or actual nuclear use – intentional or unintentional – cannot be ignored.
We now find ourselves at a critical juncture. In addition to UN75, this year also marks the 75th commemoration of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is an indisputable fact that even a single nuclear explosion causes catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
Through the years, many important steps have been taken, many crucial commitments made. They cannot not be left unheeded. We owe it to those who have fought for a better, more stable world before us, as well as to future generations who are yet to realize the excessive debt we risk bequeathing to them.
Chair,
The strong engagement by the UN Secretary-General, including through his Agenda for Disarmament, remains an important tool in our efforts. As a champion for dialogue and gender, Sweden will continue to work with the UN, member states, and civil society in promoting the agenda and delivering on our commitments.
As a government with a feminist foreign policy, it is Sweden’s strong conviction that applying a gender equality perspective in all aspects of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament will help improve the functioning of our collective work and strengthen international peace and security.
Chair,
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the very cornerstone of our efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, entered into force 50 years ago. As we approach the 10th Review Conference of the treaty, much is at stake. It will be of paramount importance that we not only reaffirm the continued validity of previous commitments made within the NPT framework, but also advance their implementation in all aspects. There should be no backtracking.
When Sweden launched the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament in June 2019, we did so with a strong conviction that political engagement was much needed for an ambitious yet realistic outcome of the Review Conference, not least in relation to article VI. Our initiative gathers 16 non-nuclear weapon states, representing different geographical and security-policy perspectives, but united in our desire to unlock disarmament diplomacy by constructive engagement.
At the second ministerial meeting of the Initiative in Berlin in February, our ministers adopted a declaration and an annex with concrete proposals for ‘stepping stones’ for nuclear disarmament, steps that if taken could lay the ground for further progress down the road. The proposed measures cover areas such as minimizing the risk of conflict and accidental nuclear weapon use, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines and enhancing nuclear disarmament verification. Promoting disarmament education and ensuring the full and effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament are other elements.
The ‘stepping stones’ document has been formally submitted as a working paper to the NPT Review Conference. Over the last months, we have reached out to nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike with an invitation to align with our proposals. We are happy to see that several countries have already chosen to support our cause. To the rest of you, we once again extend the invitation to co-sponsor the ‘stepping stones’ document.
Chair,
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a crucial part of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its entry-into-force remains an item at the top of the disarmament community’s ”to do-list”. Sweden’s strong political and technical support to CTBT is steadfast. We urge all remaining annex 2 states to promptly take concrete steps towards ratification. Pending entry-into-force, all existing moratoria on nuclear test explosions must be maintained.
With its confidence-building qualities in terms of relations between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, disarmament verification remains one of the success stories of recent years. Sweden is proud to be engaged in the IPNDV and the QUAD projects, both of which continue to deliver concrete insights into future verification requirements, as well as in the new GGE soon to be established. We strongly encourage more nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to engage in this area.
Chair,
We note that in a not too distant future the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons is likely to enter into force. Due to certain shortcomings in the treaty, Sweden has decided against signing or seeking ratification of the treaty in its current form. We will, however, seek to become an observer state once the treaty enters into force.
Chair,
Nuclear Weapon States carry a special responsibility in relation to nuclear disarmament and arms control. The time available for extending the New START, a treaty critical for global security, is shortly running out. Sweden calls on the US and Russia to promptly agree on an extension, thereby avoiding a scenario in which the world, for the first in almost 50 years, is left without any regulatory framework for strategic nuclear arsenals. An extension of the New START would constitute a key scene setter for the NPT Review Conference. Recent exploratory talks between the US and Russia on possible future arms control regimes are encouraging and can hopefully pave the way for negotiations on concrete arrangements. We would welcome Chinese participation in the process ahead, as we would the inclusion of more types of weapon systems, in particular non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Chair,
Sweden remains strongly committed to preventing an arms race in outer space. Preserving and strengthening the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities is crucial for international peace and security and for safeguarding the peaceful uses of space for future generations. This requires strengthened international cooperation on outer space.
Sweden sees the need for strengthening the normative framework and does not exclude further legally binding measures in the future. Transparency and confidence-building measures, reducing the risks of misunderstandings and miscalculations, have a key role to play. Given the dual-use nature of many space systems, we see great merit in an approach centred around responsible behaviour. Sweden therefore welcomes the draft resolution Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours. Sweden also urges all states to refrain from harmful activities such as the intentional destruction of space objects that would generate debris.
Chair,
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an indispensable role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear and radiation safety, and facilitating the use of nuclear technology, including in areas such as health, food and agriculture, desalination and water purification. Sweden was proud to serve as Chair of the Board of Governors from September 2019 to September 2020. We are impressed with the way the Agency has been able to continue its work during the COVID-19 pandemic and despite many challenging tasks, including safeguards issues.
It is essential that the Agency receives the necessary political and financial support. We must also ensure that the Agency has adequate inspection tools and should therefore continue to work for the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.
The DPRK’s nuclear and missiles programmes remain a major threat to the global non-proliferation regime. The DPRK should formalize its commitments towards denuclearization in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, including by signing and ratifying the CTBT.
Sweden, and the EU, continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which contributes to regional and international peace and security. In that vein, Sweden recently joined INSTEX. The systematic non-compliance by Iran of the nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA is a matter of grave concern. At the same time, we deeply regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the unilateral re-imposition of sanctions. The Joint Statement on 26 August by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran ended months of Iranian non-cooperation. It is crucial that all IAEA verification activities in Iran now proceed without any further delay and that Iran henceforth cooperates fully and in a timely manner with the Agency in the implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Chair,
Any use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law.
Once again, we reiterate that it is crucial and urgent to hold accountable the perpetrators of chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic. Its continued violations of its obligations as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a matter of great concern and must be condemned in the strongest terms by the international community – by the General Assembly and all other relevant fora.
Sweden condemns the assassination attempt on the Russian politician Mr. Alexei Navalny, who was poisoned in Russia by a military chemical nerve agent of the “Novichok” group – as confirmed by OPCW-designated laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden. We have full confidence in Germany’s handling of this case and welcome its request for technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat.
We expect the Russian Federation to immediately conduct a credible and transparent investigation of the assassination attempt on Mr Navalny. We also call upon the Russian Federation’s authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial international investigation and to bring those responsible to justice.
A firm and unanimous political support for the international norms on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and the institutions we have created for their implementation, should be an obvious expectation in today’s world. Regretfully, we are witnessing the opposite. We note with great concern attempts to discredit the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Sweden firmly rejects such efforts. We stand steadfastly behind the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat.
Chair,
We strongly support the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and regret the stalemate in the work on its implementation in the period following its last review conference in 2016. Having said that, we underscore the value the work of the meetings of experts during the intersessional period and look forward to more productive outcomes at the next Review Conference, scheduled for 2021. The current pandemic should be a reminder of the biological threat. We must now unite in facing the challenges affecting all of us.
Chair,
A holistic approach to global security challenges is more important than ever. This includes combating the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons, which continue to pose a threat to peace, security and sustainable development throughout the world. Addressing this important issue requires both continued implementation of multilateral agreements such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the International Tracing Instrument, as well as continued support to programmes that address physical security threats and the socioeconomic dimensions of armed violence at a local and regional level.
Chair,
The ever more rapid technological development poses new challenges within the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It is important to find effective solutions that prevent unwanted development – the area of LAWS is no exception. Sweden is of the strong conviction that IHL continues to apply fully to all weapon systems and that human control over the use of force always must be upheld. Sweden supports the work of the GGE on LAWS. The CCW is the central forum in which to continue discussions on these issues. The 11 Guiding Principles are a welcomed step forward that should form the basis for further progress. We need to continue to seek consensus around the central elements of LAWS, not least those related to what constitutes human control.
Chair,
Let me conclude by reminding everyone that much is at stake come 2021, a crucial year for multilateralism, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Although many signs point in the wrong direction, there is still time to unlock disarmament diplomacy and to begin delivering upon commitments.
Sweden intends to do its part. We call on all states to constructively engage in discussions that can lead to real progress on the ground.
Thank you and let us get to work.